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would A central aspect of the dynamic problem facing the firm in an evolving
industry is the decision about additions to productive capacity. Particu-
larly in capital intensive industries, capacity decisions have long lead
times and involve commitments of resources may be large in
relation to firms' total capitalization. If the firm fails to add capacity at the
..S10. appropriate time, it not only loses immediate sales and market shares but
also may diminish its long-run competitive position—if the firm adds too
muchcapacity, it can be burdened with unmet fixed charges for long
periods of time. From a competitive standpoint, additions to capacity can ia of
posemajor problems since the matching of capacity to demand is often a
major determinant of industry rivalry and profits. The problem is most
acute in industries producing standardized products, where product dif-
ferentiation does not protect firms against mistaken capacity decisions of
others.
The capacity decision not only involves high stakes, but also is fraught
with subleties. In the presence of lead times and lumpiness, it requires
expectations about future demand. It also involves the oligopolistic inter-
dependence problem, since the capacity decisions of competitors over the
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planninghorizon will determine the profitability of decisions by a single research
firm. These complexities suggest that modeling the capacity expansion approaci
process in an industry may have a high payout in understanding the The p
structural conditions which drive it, the nature of equilibria, and the reader's
implications for the optimal capacity decisions of individual firms. Section
This paper attempts to model the capacity expansion process through ment op
the analysis of aspecificrecent case: the corn wet milling industry. The discusser
corn wet milling industry is typical of many large, undifferentiated prod- market.
uct industries in the economy and provides a useful setting for such a wet mill
study. While the model developed here uses data from corn wet milling, describe
its structure and the principles that emerge are applicable to the capacity the effe(
expansion process generally. Part of our purpose, however, has been to process
show how economic analysis can play a role in setting corporate invest- Some
ment decisions. For this purpose, the case study seemed well suited. than in 1
Incarrying out this case study, we had several objectives. The analysis section
done here is similar to the analysis that would be carried out by a firm 8.11.
doing a careful job of corporate planning leading up to a major invest-
ment decision. We wanted to understand what the ingredients in such a
8 1Th problem looked like from the decision maker's Of central
concern was the predictability of the behavior of rivals and the analysis The
that would go into such predictions. It is our tentative conclusion that product
starting from common views about the nature of the market opportunity, industr3
firms can develop consistent views about their rivals' behavior and the primaril
returns to their own investment. Part of our purpose is to set out one used
version of the analytical model that would give rise to these shared and used as
consistent predictions. This aspect of the study could be titled "The Corn
Structure of the Dynamic Equilibrium." grind")
In addition to the model itself, we have been interested in the way in convert
which the dynamic equilibrium varies with the underlying structural tion us
attributes, particularly the amount of uncertainty about demand for the ments t
product. The paper contains several observations about the impact of 30,0001
uncertainty on investment decisions and industry evolution. These are of $30
thoughts that could be developed further; using a theoretical model. this in p
There are interesting differences in the ways in which firms respond to million
risks that emerge in the case study and that influence their investment scale p1
decisions. The
These and related issues need not be studied exclusively in the context. domina
of a case study. Indeed, they would not, but we found that the case study consisti
which forces one to attend to what the decision maker would find impor- historic
tant and does not allow one to ignore relevant features of the problem is a early 1
useful way of locating the central conceptual issues and of shedding some "outsid
light on the determinants of the evolution of industries in what (from a Process
static point of view) is a disequilibrium situation. It is our hope that
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researchers in economics and business administration will find the
approach useful and provocative.
The paper can be read in a number of ways, depending upon the
reader's interest in the details of the analysis of the corn wet milling case.
Section 8.1 describes the corn wet milling industry and a major invest-
ment opportunity presented by high fructose corn syrup. Section 8.2
discusses the model used to analyze the capacity expansion process in the
market. The next six sections (8.3 through 8.8) present the details of corn
wet milling economics and the assumptions of the model. Section 8.9
describes the equilibrium in the market. Sections 8.10 and 8.11 discuss
the effects of varying degrees of uncertainty on the capacity expansion
process and the sources of the expectations of firms in the industry.
Some readers may be interested more in the approach and the model
than in the corn wet milling industry. Our suggestion would be to read
section 8.1 as an introduction, and then read section 8.2, 8.9, 8.10, and
8.11.
8.1The Corn Wet Milling Industry
The corn wet milling industry converts corn into two major end
products: cornstarch and corn syrup.2 Except for a small fraction of
industry output, cornstarch and corn syrup are commodity products, sold
primarily to the food, textile, paper, and adhesives industries. Starch is
used primarily as a stiffening and texturizing agent, while corn syrup is
used as a texturizer, thickener, and sweetener.
Corn is ground into starch slurry (this operation is termed "basic
grind"), which can be either further processed into finished starch or
converted into corn syrup through a chemical process. Industry produc-
tion uses continuous process technology, and the size of efficient incre-
ments to capacity is large. The minimum efficient scale plant processes
30,000 bushels of corn per day and represents an investment cost in excess
of $30 million. Efficient increments to capacity are equally large. To put
this in perspective, the total grind capacity of the industry in 1972 was 108
million bushels per day, the equivalent of thirty-six minimum efficient
scale plants.
The corn wet milling industry had been a stable industry for decades,
dominated by Corn Products Company (now CPC International) and
consisting of approximately a dozen firms. Competition in the industry
historically could be described as "gentlemanly." Through the 1960s and
early 1970s, however, the industry was rocked by the entry of three
"outsiders," all large commodity processing and trading firms (Grain
Processing, Cargill, and Archer-Daniels-Midland). A period of intense
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terized the industry from the late 1960s until 1972 as the new entrants of gaini
two HF were assimilated; a few firms left the industry in the process. By 1972 and
into 1973, however, industry capacity utilization had risen back to high guarani
levels and the industry consisted of eleven firms, was to
The In 1972, however, this old industry was confronted by a potentially
HFCS revolutionary development—the commercialization of high fructose corn
syrup (HFCS). HFCS, a commodity product, is a corn syrup very high in begin I
fructose, or sweetness. It is made by further conversion of conventional high fri
would corn syrup to add to its sweetness content. HFCS is a substitute for sugar
and is intrinsically somewhat cheaper to produce than sugar. If HFCS syrup
were to replace a significant proportion of sugar, this new product would grindir
and co approximately double the size of the corn wet milling industry. Thus, the
exogenous shock of HFCS's commercialization in 1972, proved a reality grated
refinin by initial sales of the product to the food industry by corn wet millers
If a Standard Brands, and Staley Manufacturing Company, confronted every
firm in the industry with an important decision about adding capacity to capaci
ity fro produce the new product.
S miller
8.1.1The HFCS Capacity Decision 4 these
syrup The firms confronting the decision about HFCS faced a myriad decisi
issues. The first was the expected level of demand and the rate at which Co
users would convert from sugar to HFCS. The principal market for HFCS contu
is the liquid sugar market of which soft drinks are the dominant end use. termt The growth of the HFCS market depended on the rate at which users
reformulated their products to allow the use of HFCS, and hence on the
capac
level of sugar prices and the consequent inducement to reformulate. exce
Although HFCS was believed to be almost completely substitutable for the F
sugar, small and subjective changes in the taste of some products oc-
curred. This required additional care in product reformulation, and use ii though this was not costly, fears about not duplicating the taste of
products was a barrier to changeover. Also, the somewhat different I-IFd
physical properties of HFCS required some product reformulation in woul
some cases. HFC
The incentive of the user to change over to HFCS depended on the and
spread between the cost of HFCS and the price of sugar. HFCS costs less TI
to produce than sugar, but sugar prices were highly volatile. Sugar was costs
traded in a very politicized world market, with less developed countries the i4
as major suppliers. Sugar prices were supported above world market to
prices by legislation in. the United States. It was believed that the trend in expe'
sugar prices would be up reflecting increased costs of production, though discd
predicting sugar prices over the long run was difficult. l-IF(
HFCS demand also depended to some extent upon the HFCS capacity
that was actually built. Large users of sugar were unlikely to convert to ther
HFCS unless enough capacity was on-stream that they could be assured
I
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of gaining adequate supplies and would not be at the mercy of only one or
trants two HFCS suppliers. Thus, demand and supply were interdependent; this
2 and guaranteed some temporary excess capacity if high demand for HFCS
high was to occur.
The second major issue facing a corn wet miller in deciding about
itially HFCS capacity was what way to participate in HFCS. If a firm decided to
corn begin HFCS production at all, it had a number of alternatives. Because
.igh in high fructose production involved further conversion of corn syrup, a firm
tional would enter the HFCS market by diverting capacity it had used for corn
sugar syrup production into HFCS. Alternatively, it could divert basic corn
EIFCS grinding capacity, but build additional facilities to produce corn syrup
would and convert it into HFCS. Finally, the firm could construct fully inte-
is, the grated HFCS capacity, consisting of corn grinding capacity, corn syrup
eality refining capacity, and HFCS conversion capacity.
nillers If a firm chose to divert either grind capacity or integrated corn syrup
every capacity into the production of HFCS, it was necessarily removing capac-
city to ity from the corn syrup or starch markets. Thus, if enough corn wet
millers diverted capacity, supply would be insufficient to meet demand in
these other markets and prices in them would rise. As a result, the corn
syrup and starch profits of each firm dependedonbthe HFCS capacity
iad of decision of all the other firms.
which Conversely, the fact that HFCS production was at the end of the
HFCS continuous process technology with starch slurry and corn syrup as in-
d use. termediate products meant that the construction of integrated HFCS
users
)n the
capacity was not without risk for the starch and corn syrup markets. If the
ulate integrated capacity constructed by firms in the industry significantly
• exceeded demand for HFCS, then the output of the upstream stages of
)le for the HFCS production process could. be diverted into the starch or corn
syrup markets. What is more, grind and corn syrup capacity diverted for
use in HFCS production could be put back into the starch and corn syrup ste of markets. Thus, if the HFCS capacity exceeded demand, not only would ferent HFCS prices be depressed, but the starch and/or corn syrup markets ion in would deteriorate. Even if a firm chose not to enter into the production of
HFCS, it could not escape the effects of HFCS if this scenario occurred, )fl the
;ts less and its profits depended on the HFCS capacity decisions of its rivals.
The profitability of HFCS would depend on the spread between HFCS was
costs and prices. Prices would be a function of the capacity utilization in intries the industry and of the price of sugar. If the demand for HFCS were close narket to or exceeded the HFCS capacity put on-stream, then HFCS would be end in
• hough expected to be priced relative to sugar (at approximately a 15 percent
discount). However, if there were substantial excess HFCS capacity, then
HFCS would likely be priced relative to cost. A significant part of HFCS •pacity
costs were variable, the major element being the cost of corn. However, vert to
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from experience in the starch and corn syrup markets, in periods of
substantial overcapacity the price of HFCS was likely to be near variable
costs.
Other issues were access to HFCS production technology and the likely
future changes in that technology. HFCS production technology was
being licensed in 1972 by Standard Brands, the pioneer producer.
However, other firms were also offering technology, and it was believed
to be within reach of all the participants in the corn wet milling industry in
1972, though they might face a modest delay if they chose not to license
from Standard Brands. HFCS technology was sure to improve, but there
were no predictions that the basic process would change so that firms
could gain significantly by waiting to invest.
Finally, a firm choosing not to enter into HFCS production faced a
number of risks besides those described above. It would forego having a
full line of corn sweeteners, all of which were sold to basically the same
group of customers who might value dealing with a full-line firm. It would
also give up the sales revenue and cash flow of participation in this
potentially large market. This could increase vulnerability.to price wars
and might have a cost in terms of less capital to invest in the industry.
In 1972 there were eleven major firms in the corn wet milling industry.
A list of the competitors and their capacities for producing HFCS and
other products (starch and corn syrup) is given in table 8.1. The analysis
that follows is conducted in terms of operating profits and margins. For
the record, however, the costs of HFCS are roughly as in table 8.2.
8.2The Approach to Assessing Competitor Behavior
and the Evolution of the Market
In modeling the evolution of the corn wet milling industry, one is faced
(as an analyst and as a competitor) with complexity created by the very
I
I
Table 8.1 Firms and Capacitiesin 1972 (millions of pounds)
Capacity in Starch HFCS
Firm and Corn Syrup Capacity




CPC International 3,439 0
Grain Processing 1,396 0
Hubinger 634 -0
Pennick & Ford 825 0
National Starch 571 0
Staley 2,021 200



























Table 8.2 Costs of HFCS
Cost Component Cost per lb.
Raw materials (net of by-products) 2—4
Variable processing costs 2—4
Overhead 1—2
Capital cost at full capacity
utilization 2.5—4
large number of possible outcomes. Such complexity is often dealt with
by using scenarios, and we employ that procedure here. Scenarios simply
aggregate continuously varying outcomes into a manageable number. of
interestingly different groupings. Thus, instead of describing demand by
its level each year, for example, one can approximate the full range of
outcomes with low, medium, and high demand scenarios. There is of
course a risk in proceeding in this way. The scenarios, being approxima-
tions, can be incorrectly chosen so as to obscure important differences.
The alternative, however, is an unmanageably large number of variables
that make rigorous analysis impractical.
The second reason for employing scenarios relates to the sequential
character of capacity decisions. Capacity decisions are not made on a
once-for-all basis at a single point of time by every competitor. There is in
fact a sequence of decisions through time, with information from the
market about demand, prices, and competitors' behavior pouring in. As a
practical matter, this must also be simplified. The approach taken here is
to characterize the industry's evolution in terms of scenarios for purposes
of predicting the "first round" decisions of competitors. The alternative is
to try to deal with the full sequence of decisions, a procedure that also
quickly becomes impractically complicated.
The modeling effort is guided by the following broad structure. For the
individual firm, the profitability of its operations and its HFCS capacity
decisions are determined by two sets of factors: (a) the evolution of
demand and sugar prices, the latter being a predominant influence on
HFCS prices, and (b) the capacity expansion decisions of its competitors.
The demand-related factors are subject to uncertainty. And as noted
earlier, they are not independent of capacity expansion. The decisions of
competitors and the implications of those decisions for industry capacity
are to be predicted.
Competitor analysis and the prediction of the pattern of industry
capacity expansion are the central focus of our analysis. The fundamental
principle we employ in searching for equilibrium is that the predicted
industry capacity and the predicted behavior of rivals must be consistent.
Consistency involves the following chain of reasoning.
The capacity decisions of individual competitors will depend in part
upon the industry capacity expansion path that they anticipate. These
decisions will also depend upon their preferences, their attitudes toward
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risk, their financial resources, and other factors. While firms' decisions deman
depend upon anticipated capacity in the industry, actual industry capacity d
clearly depends upon firms' capacity decisions. Consistency requires that decisk
the anticipated pattern of industry capacity expansion is that which floWs
results from the predicted capacity decisions of the firms in the industry, for co
whose decisions are in turn conditional on the anticipated industry capac- capaci
ity. This consistency requirement is an equilibrium in the sense that and ca
expectations converge on outcomes that are consistent with the behavior
of rivals. static j
There is of course no logical reason why firms could not have expecta- Ifl tI
tions that were inconsistent with the likely behavior of rivals. But it does LflVeSti
seem reasonable to assume that as part of the process of generating and the op
refining their expectations, firms will check their projections for aggre- nario.
gate industry capacity against their analysis of competitors' decisions in
the light of industry capacity. Anticipating that other firms are engaged in preferj
the same process, a single firm should expect industry capacity expansion mine
to be the result of predicted choices about rivals behavior, and it should ment
expect rivals to come to the same or similar conclusions. Consistency then (B)
simply summarizes the idea that intelligent rivals will converge in their tiOfl ai
expectationsabout each others' behavior.3 sharei
The ingredients in the model are illustrated in figure 8.1. The figure can showi
be read as follows. We begin at (A) with an assumption about the path






















Components of capacity expansion model.1 267 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
demand, gives random net cash flows for each possible capacity expan-
Lons sion decision for each firm. The combining of demands, investment
pacity decisions by individual firms, and industry capacity expansion into cash
wh flows over time involves an economic model of the industry. That model
for corn wet milling is laid out in sections 8.3 to 8.8. The model takes
capacity, demand, and sugar prices and generates prices, profit margins,
;e that and capacity utilization rates.. The latter are then used to project cash
havior flows for various possible investment decisions. The point is that there is a
static industry model built in here.
':pecta- In the language of microeconomics, the random cash flows that go with
it does investment decisions can be thought of as the opportunity set, or, rather,
ag and the opportunity set, conditional on the industry capacity expansion sce-
aggre- nario. In selecting a level of investment, the firm is selecting a random
ions in sequence of cash flows. Those random cash flows combined with firm
iged in preferences with respect to risk, return, and financial resources deter-
ansion mine optimal capacity decisions for each firm. The individual firm invest-
;hould ment decisions add up each year to give a time path for industry capacity
then (B). Note that the entire sequence is conditional on the starting assump-
a their tion at (A). The consistency check is whether (A) and (B) are the same. A
shared assumption about industry capacity which failed, via the process
ire can shown in figure 8.1, to generate the same industry capacity expansion
Ut the path would not result from rational firm choices. It would therefore not
indom be the assumption that careful firms would make. The expected evolution
of industry capacity is that path that reproduces itself in figure 8.1. Then
individual firm decisions and implied (uncertain) cash flows are the ones
associated with that capacity expansion path.
From this description, it is easy to see that competitor analysis is the
central feature of this model. The equilibrium is really the industry path
that will withstand careful competitor analysis. Of course, if firms fail to
check their assumptions in this way, then other paths could result. The
hypothesis here is that they do.
This equilibrium assumption can be modified in a variety of ways to
take into account the fact that firms' perceptions of uncertain events may
differ and that their perceptions may be erroneous. The model allows
firms' preferences, capabilities, and financial resources to influence their
decisions. But the central organizing principle remains that anticipated
growth must be consistent with rival firms' decisions, conditional on
anticipated capacity growth.
It is worth noting that part of the economic structure of the model
includes the assumption that there are no futures markets for high fruc-
tose corn syrup. Thus, firms cannot (and as far as we could tell did not)
engage in futures contracts that assured both the quantity and price of
future output from the plants they built. It is an interesting question why
these markets did not exist. We will not try to give a complete answer268 MichaelE. Porter/A.Michael Spence
here. We suspect that informational asymmetrics between the producers
and buyers of HFCS concerning the completeness of the substitutability
of HFCS for sugar made it difficult to structure contracts that would Shift
part of the risk to buyers or to third parties. Given that futures contracts
did not exist, the planning process outlined in figure 8.1 can be thought of
as a partial substitute for the price mechanism that would arbitrate these
investment decisions in a general equilibrium world with a complete set
of markets.
As Professor Winter points out in his insightful remarks in the com-
ment to this paper, our hypothesis is that the evolving oligopoly, deprived
of the full complement of markets required to guide investment deci-
sions, calculates the equilibrium in the market and then makes the associ-
ated investment decisions. This calculated equilibrium is not the same
one that would result with the full set of futures markets, because of the
increased uncertainty that is created by the absence of those markets.
The detailed development of the model for the HFCS problem includes
the following steps. First, a range of possible scenarios for demand and
sugar prices is set out, with some assessment of their likelihoods. Next, a
range of possible capacity expansion paths for the industry is constructed.
Third, we assess the implications for profitability of a variety of capacity
addition strategies for individual firms, conditional on demand and indus-
try capacity expansion. Fourth, taking into account uncertainty about
demand and individual firm characteristics, we determine the decisions
the firms are likely to take, conditional on each of the industry capacity
expansion scenarios. Finally, we ask which of the capacity expansion
scenarios is most consistent with the sum of the capacity decisions of the
firms. That becomes the predicted evolution of the industry and a predic-
tion of the associated decisions for each firm. This sequence is carried out
for the decisions taken in 1972 and checked against the historical record.
8.3Demand and Sugar Price Scenarios
The potential demand for HFCS over the planning horizon depended
on the proportion of sugar users who could be converted to HFCS. The
1972 demand for sugar was 14.3 billion pounds, of which 5.3 billion
pounds was liquid sugar.4 HFCS substituted for sugar on approximately a
pound for pound basis. On the basis of the range of expert opinion in
1972, we can construct three scenarios for HFCS demand by 1980, as
shown in table 8.3.
Demand is uncertain in two respects. The long-run size of the market
and the rates at which actual demand would approach the long-run levels
were matters of opinion. In constructing the scenarios depicted in table
































































of various long-run demands and rates of adoption of HFCS by the major
potential users.
Demand over the 1973—80 time period was assumed to be an S-shaped
function of time, and the time paths for demand in each of the low,
medium and high scenarios are shown in table 8.4. The S-shaped function
was chosen to reflect the path of adoption usually followed by new
products such as HFCS. Given uncertainties and the costs of changeover,
users convert slowly in the early years, with changeovers occurring at an
accelerated rate once large-scale changeover begins to occur. Actual
HFCS demand in 1972 was approximately 400 million pounds.
Sugar prices over the planning horizon could also vary. We simplify by
abstracting from the short-run variation in sugar prides and creating three
scenarios for average sugar prices between 1972 and 1980, also shown in
table 8.3. Sugar prices were widely expected to be in the eighteen cent
range, and this is taken as the medium sugar price
scenariorepresents the floor of industry estimates and past history,
with the high scenario an arbitrary figure selected on the basis of past
sugar price movements and expectations in 1972. It was assumed that
although sugar prices would fluctuate in the short run, these fluctuations
could be ignored, and the average figures were used in calculations over
the planning horizon.5
Demand for HFCS and sugar prices are not independent, however, as
discussed above. Therefore, all the possible combinations of demand and
sugar prices portrayed in table 8.3 are not in the feasible set. Demand for
HFCS is very unlikely to be high unless sugar prices are high, and vice
versa. Using this principle, three of the nine combinations in table 8.3
were eliminated, leaving six demand/sugar price scenarios. These six
scenarios became the exogenous environment or states of nature in the
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
High demand 1.1 2.0 3.0 4.4 7.2 8.8 9.5 10.0
Medium demand.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0
Low demand .66 .92 1.18 1.44 1.7 1.96 2.22 2.5


























Table 8.4 HFCS Demand Scenarios (billions of pounds)
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model. Firms' expectations over these scenarios were an important part We
of their decision making problem. capaciJ
One might suspect that if the demand for HFCS were high and began to two Sc1
cut into the liquid sugar market, then the price of sugar would be cut as a capaci
response. Our view is that the HFCS market was not big enough to affect scribe
worldwide sugar prices significantly. Moreover, sugar prices appear to be total I
set as a first approximation by raw sugar prices and a relatively stable and to
refining cost and profit margin. Hence, the model takes sugar prices as low p
random, but exogenous with respect to the development of the HFCS assuri
market. This is an approximation, one we felt did not do excessive
capac
One additional aspect of HFCS demand is built into the model, reflect- More
ing buyer behavior for this important input to their products. As de- corn
scribed above, major buyers are unlikely to change over to HFCS unless amou
sufficient capacity is on-stream to serve their needs without making them in the
vulnerable to interruptions and bargaining power by a few suppliers. As a servi
result, it is assumed that the high demand scenario cannot occur unless incre
substantial capacity is added. This interdependence of supply and de- of w
mand will be further reflected in the capacity/conversion scenarios de- serio
scribed below. TI
Demand for products in the traditional corn milling markets—corn- inta
starch and corn syrup—is assumed to be constant at 1972 levels. This refle
corresponds to our use of 1972 figures for sugar demand. While both man
sugar demand and corn syrup/cornstarch demand were expected to grow, HF(
their expected rates of growth were similar and introducing growth into
the analysis would needlessly complicate the model. The growth rates in thre
the conventional markets were expected to be in the range of 3 percent
per year. ThL
1971
8.4Capacity Decisions of Competitors
sce
To rationally make its own capacity decision, each firm had to predict
the HFCS capacity that other corn wet millers would put on-stream and
b the degree to which they would convert capacity presently used in the
other markets to HFCS. To do this, the firm had to assess each competi-
tor's situation and predict the decision that the competitor would make.
For purposes of the model, we simplify by assuming that the firm makes Hig
aggregatepredictionsabout the behavior of its rivals. It predicts (a) the
total HFCS capacity its competitors will add over the planning horizon
Me
and (b)thedegree to which that capacity will be converted from uses in
the corn syrup and cornstarch markets. The latter is critical because it will
influence the supply/demand balance and hence prices in the markets for Lol
cornstarch and corn syrup.
























We further simplify by abstracting the firm's predictions about the total
capacity additions of its competitors into three capacity scenarios and into
two scenarios about the extent of conversion. The scenarios for total
capacity added are chosen to correspond to the demand scenarios de-
scribed above. High total capacity additions by competitors will meet the
total 1980 demand for HFCS in the high demand scenario, while medium
and low total capacity additions by competitors will meet the medium and
low 1980 HFCS demands, respectively. For the conversion scenarios, it is
assumed either that competitors will convert no capacity—add all HFCS
capacity on a fully integrated basis—or that 25percentof the total HFCS
capacity added by competitors will be converted from other markets.
Moreover, since capacity equaled demand in 1972 for cornstarch and
corn syrup, 25 percent conversion appeared to be the upper limit of the
amount of capacity that would be converted in view of the profit potential
in the other markets and the need to maintain customer relationships by
serving their needs in the other markets. Heavy conversion of capacity
increased the risk of alienation of customers in the other markets, many
of whom would also be HFCS purchasers, and this could be especially
serious if HFCS demand did not materialize.
The three scenarios for total competitor capacity additions are shown
in table 8.5. The time path of competitor capacity additions was chosen to
reflect lead times in capacity addition and the interdependence of de-
mand and supply. Given the two-year lead time in adding integrated
HFCS capacity and the one year needed to convert capacity, very little
capacity could come on-stream in 1973 and 1974, which is reflected in all
three scenarios. To achieve medium and especially high demand, much
capacity would have to be put on-stream early in the planning period.
Thus, we assume that capacity is put on-stream on an accelerated basis in
1975 and 1976, ahead of demand.
Where the capacity scenario did not match the actual I-IFCS demand
scenario, excess or deficient capacity would become apparent in the
Table 8.5 Capacity Expansion Scenarios (billions of pounds)
197319741975 1976 1977197819791980Demand
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capacity expansion is chosen to reflect and is conditional on the level of
demand in the HFCS markets. In table 8.5 each capacity expansion path
branches into three subpaths in 1976, depending upon the observed level
of demand. Thus, the pattern of capacity expansion from 1976 onward
depends upon the demand-growth scenario that actually occurred.6
Further, as argued earlier, high demand growth was very unlikely when
capacity was low because the major buyers of HFCS were reluctant to
switch over from sugar until there was sufficient capacity in the HFCS
market to meet their needs. Later, in assigning probabilities to demand
scenarios, we make the probability of high demand zero when capacity
expansion is low.
8.5AlternativeStrategies
Each firm has a number of strategies available to it in HFCS. In the
model, we allowed six possible strategies as shown in table 8.6. If the firm
chose to do nothing, it simply continued to operate in the cornstarch and
corn syrup markets. It could benefit if capacity was diverted into HFCS
through conversion that removed capacity from those other markets, and
it was vulnerable if excess capacity in HFCS caused the dumping of HFCS
capacity into the traditional markets.
The most conservative strategy for entering HFCS production was to
convert capacity from the other markets to HFCS by appending HFCS
refining facilities to an existing plant. While a firm could theoretically
choose to convert less, we assumed that the conversion option involved
one minimum efficient scale, or MES. An MES plant has the capacity to
grind 30,000 bushels per day of corn. A 30,000 bushel per day plant was
capable of producing 357 million pounds of HFCS per year. The invest-
ment cost of adding HFCS refining capacity to an existing plant was
estimated through industry interviews at $9 million, and conversion could
take place in one year.7
More aggressive strategies were to build fully integrated HFCS capac-
ity by either constructing a separate "greenfield" plant or adding another
production unit to an existing corn wet milling complex. All options of
constructing integrated capacity had an assumed lead time of two years.
Firms could actually speed up construction slightly at an added cost. Two
years was the most likely construction time, and the possibility of acceler-
ated construction was eliminated from the model for simplicity.
The strategy of adding another production unit to an existing complex
enabled the firm to economize on investment costs, because certain
in infrastructure such as railroad sidings, storage facilities,
and maintenance facilities could be shared. We have assumed that only


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0•.1 274 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
new investment in infrastructure would have to be made, and we have the
further assumed initially that each firm had at least one existing corn wet not
milling complex where one such plant could be added at low investment the
cost. The investment cost for one MES greenfleld production unit was
estimated at $50million,while the investment for an add-on unit was $36 calcut
million. These investment outlays were spread over the two years of retul
construction. While the add-on strategy clearly dominated adding a capa4
greenfield plant if each firm was assumed to have one production complex lOW,
where an add-on could be made, this assumption was easily relaxed later are
in the analysis. Lal
Thefifth strategy involved adding two MES units of integrated produc-
tion capacity for HFCS. As in the previous options, the firm was assumed the
to have the ability to add on one unit at lower investment cost. It added weig
the other MES sized unit through a greenfield plant at correspondingly Con
higher investment. The final strategic option was to add three MES units antic
of capacity, of which two were greenfield and one was add-on. This final of si
strategy spread investment costs over three years, and capacity came run
on-stream in 1975 and 1976. All the strategies are described in table 8.6. eigh
It was assumed that three MES sized production was the max- app
imum capacity any one firm could add in the HFCS market. This was ate
based on the massive investment cost of HFCS capacity, but the option
. slov
adding a fourth HFCS production unit could be easily added to the asst
model. We further assumed that mixed strategies involving conversion
and construction of integrated HFCS capacity would not be adopted. 8.7
This was because the conversion option was a low risk, low investment
way to participate in HFCS which appeared to be inconsistent with
making major investment outlays in constructing integrated HFCS capac- 1
ity. While a firm might convert capacity in the short run to speed HFCS sce
output onto the market, at the same time building capacity which would
take a year longer to come on-stream, this tactical step was not allowed in bel
the model for simplicity. dei
pri
8.6Expectations concerning Demand and Sugar Prices
How a particular investment appears to a firm will depend heavily upon
the expectations with respect to demand and sugar prices described above
in terms of scenarios. These expectations evolve over time as new in-
formation becomes available. It is possible for firms to have divergent
expectations about these events, though there are forces that tend to
produce convergent expectations (see section 8.11).
Initially, we have attributed to the firms the same views with respect to
demand and sugar prices. We have also tested the sensitivity of the results
to changes in these expectations. What actually occurred in the corn wet
milling industry was a combination of unexpectedly high sugar prices in
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the 1973—75 period and. an extraordinarily optimistic set of projections
not only by firms, but also by securities analysts and other observers of
the industry.
Table 8.7 gives the probabilities that were used for the purpose of
calculating the expected present value and the standard deviations of
returns to the various capacity expansion strategies. Note that when
capacity is low, the probability of a high demand is zero. When capacity is
low, the probabilities for the remaining demand and sugar price scenarios
are the probabilities conditional on demand not being high.
Later, we report the effects of changing these probabilities. Those
shown in table 8.7 reflect what appears to have been an optimistic view of
the future, one that was widely held in the industry at the time. Little
weight was given to low sugar prices, in part because the failure of
Congress to extend the sugar price support legislation in 1974 was not
anticipated. By 1974 sugar prices proved to be so high that the enactment
of support legislation would have been politically infeasible. The long-
run cost of refined sugar was believed to be in the neighborhood of
eighteen cents per pound. The cost of HFCS, at 1972 prices of corn, was
approximately ten cents per pound. Thus, while sugar prices could fluctu-
ate significantly in the short run and while HFCS demand could develop
slowly, the longer-term economics of HFCS success seemed reasonably
assured.




















































8.7Pricing, Capacity Utilization, and Supply/Demand
in Starch and Corn Syrup
The next step in the model is to translate the demand and capacity
scenarios into product prices and capacity utilization rates, in both high
fructose corn syrup and the other markets for starch and corn syrup. We
begin with HFCS. The capacity utilization rate in HFCS is the ratio of
demand to capacity or the value one, whichever is smaller. HFCS is
priced in relation to sugar unless there is considerable excess capacity in
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HFCS. In the latter case, 1-IFCS is priced close to operating cost.8 With utir
these principles in mind, we drew up the following pricing rules for the
. (i.e
model: (a) If HFCS capacity utilization is less than 70 percent, then the to
HFCS operating margin isper pound of output regardless of the level HF
of sugar prices. This represents a loss, since capital costs are per
pound and overhead conservatively an additionalper pound. (b) if
HFCS capacity utilization is greater than 70 percent, then the HFCS is
priced in relation to sugar. Thus, if sugar prices are medium the
operating margin for HFCS is 10g.Ifsugar prices are high, the operating
margin for HFCS isper pound. If sugar prices are low, the operating
margin isper pound of output.
With respect to the markets for starch and corn syrup, two possibilities
Th arise. If capacity has been diverted to HFCS and is being used there, then
fi there will be a capacity shortage in starch and corn syrup, putting upward
r
pressure on prices. If on the other hand there is significant excess capacity
in HFCS, that capacity can be diverted back into corn syrup, creating
Tb excess capacity and downward pressure on prices. With these principles,
d the specific assumptions are as follows.
Let H be HFCS capacity and c be HFCS capacity utilization. From the
previous discussion let S be .25 if there was significant conversion (i.e., 25
ca
percent) and zero otherwise. Excess capacity in starch and corn syrup is
E=H(1—c—S). 8.
The pricing rules are as follows: (i) if E > 500 million pounds, then
operating margins on starch and corn syrup are one cent per pound, (ii) if
—500< E< 500, operating margins are three cents per pound, and (iii) if ti
E < —500 million, there is a capacity shortage and operating margins are ti
five cents per pound. ci
It remains to determine the operating profit for a typical firm in a given ii
year. To do so, we need to specify how demand is allocated to capacity in st
each of the markets. In doing this, we have treated capacity in other
products and excess HFCS capacity asymmetrically. The reasoning is a
that, provided prices are comparable, buyers of starch and corn syrup will S
stay with their regular suppliers rather than buy from an HFCS plant that s
has been opportunistically diverted back to starch and corn syrup because a
of excess capacity in HFCS. Thus, in starch and corn syrup, the old p
capacity, minus that which was converted, has first shot at the demand.
Only if there remains some unsatisfied demand does the excess HFCS
capacity get used to supply corn syrup and starch.
Suppose a firm has z units of HFCS capacity and t units of other
capacity. Let c be the HFCS capacity utilization, m the HFCS operating
margin, and q the starch operating margin. If there has been no conver- c
sion, there is no excess demand in starch and corn syrup. The profits of f
the firm are therefore mzc + qt. Here it is assumed that the firm's capacity t
Ir
277 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
With utilization matches that of the industry. If there is substantial conversion
r the (i.e., 25 percent of H), then there will be excess demand in starch relative
a the to industry capacity. The excess demand is .25H. The capacity left over in
level HFCS is H(1 —c);thus, capacity utilization for the leftover capacity is
tper .25H . .25 b) if mm1,(1—c)H=min 1,1—
',the The firm then gets additional profits of
ating
iling qz(1—c)min (1—c)=qzmin[.25,1—c].
titles Therefore, for the high conversion scenarios the operating profits for the
then firm with z units of HFCS capacity and tunitsof other capacity are
acity mzc +q[t+zmin(.25,(1—c))].
•iting This, in conjunction with the pricing rules and capacity-demand scenarios
pies, described earlier, permits one to calculate the operating profits and cash
flows through time for each firm, for various combinations of industry
ithe capacity expansion, demand, and specific decisioas by the firms.
apis
8.8The Calculation of Returns to Investment
then for Firms and Strategies
ii) if Using the probabilities described in the previous section, the assump-
ii) if tions .about pricing and capacity utilization, and the firms' initial posi-
are tions, we calculated for each firm the net cash flows of investment for each
combination of capacity, demand, and strategy. Using a discount rate of
iven 10 percent, the present values of the cash flows were calculated for each
•tY in strategy-capacity-demand combination. Next, with the probabilities as in
ther section 8.6, we calculated the expected present value of the net cash flows
ig is and standard deviation of the present value of the net cash flows for each
will strategy-capacity combination. Note that investment in starch and corn
that syrup capacity is taken as sunk; depreciation on this investment is not
iuse added back to cash flows, nor is depreciation subtracted from operating
old profit. Thus, we have a true measure of cash flows. These will be higher
md. than reported profits because the latter have depreciation on old plant
CS and equipment subtracted out.
The results are reported in appendix A, where there is one table per
ther firm, each containing thirty-six boxes corresponding to strategy-capacity
ting pairs. Thus, in table A-i for American Maize, the upper left-hand box
corresponds to the strategy of converting one minimum efficient scale
Fsof facility and to the high capacity, high conversion scenario for the indus-
try. Within each box in the tables there are five numbers. They are (a) the278 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
expected value of the present value of the net cash flows of investment thes
(EPDV), (b)thestandard deviation of the present value of the cash flows upo
(SD),(c)themaximum present value across demand scenarios 8.8.
(PVMAX), (d)theminimum present value across demand scenarios firm
(PVMIN), and (e)thesmallest cumulative cash flow for any demand
scenario for any year (CUMMIN). The fifth item requires brief comment. o
Itis included as a measure of the financial resources the firm may have to futu
mobilize in this market if demand is weak and things do not go well. As thet
one would expect, these negative cash flows usually occur in the second or pate
third year of the process when the major investments have been made, plan
but before the majority of the returns are in. The figures differ from one
company to the next because of initial differences in 1972 in overall grind ME
capacity and in HFCS capacity. These initial capacities were reported in pen
section 8.1. T
The tables are to be thought of as summarizing the financial implica- of c
tions for each firm of combinations of their own strategy and the behavior 6,5
in the aggregate of rivals. They do not tell us without further analysis nar
what the behavior of rivals, individually or collectively, will be. Rather, firn
they provide data on which to base judgments about competitor behavior i
and, hence, the most likely pattern of industry capacity expansion. We is n
turn to that task next. lea
8.9Analysis of Competitor Behavior, Expectations, cap
and Market Equilibrium (th
cot
In this section the principles described in section 8.2 are applied to the sio
case at hand. We are looking for a hypothesis about industry capacity co
expansion which, when shared by the firms in the market, will lead to
capacity expansion decisions that in the aggregate add up to that con- po
tamed in the initial hypothesis. an
The choices facing the firms are those described in the previous section ani
and summarized in appendix A. The next step is to determine what try
choices the firms will make. This can be done in a variety of ways. One
way is to apply decision criteria, such as mean-variance tradeoffs, rel- pr
atively mechanically. We did not proceed in this way. Rather, we used m
the information that was available to us concerning each firm to make
judgments about their strategic choices. The judgments about each firm's
choice from its alternatives are based upon several kinds of information:
(a) the financial consequences of alternative strategies, (b)thefirm's size, 191
financial resources, and strength, and (c)thehistorical behavior of the
firm and the implications of that behavior for corporate goals, tolerance ad
for risk, and aggressiveness.
Bwe have summarized the relevant characteristics of the ca
firms with respect to deciding among risky investment alternatives. Using rn
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nent these facts and judgments, the "best" decisions for each firm conditional
uponindustry capacity expansion were assessed and are reported in table
8.8. At the foot of each column, the total HFCS capacity implied by the
arios firms' collective decisions is reported, along with the fraction of that
iand capacity generated by converting corn syrup and starch facilities.
lent. Given our best estimate of the then-prevailing expectations about
ye to future demand, the equilibrium capacity expansion path in the industry is
I. As the medium capacity, high conversion scenario. If that outcome is antici-
or pated, firms in the aggregate will choose to install fourteen MES HFCS
iade, plants, which would provide 4,998 million pounds per year of HFCS
t one capacity over the first three to four years. Of that capacity, three to five
MES plants will be converted so that conversion is in the range of 21 to 35
edin percent of HFCS capacity—with four conversions, the percentage is 28.
The medium capacity scenario has 3,800—4,250 million pounds per year
'lica- of capacity by 1976, depending on actual demands. By 1977 that becomes
wior 6,500 million pounds. Thus, the medium capacity, high conversion sce-
ilysis nario had the required consistency property; the predicted behavior of
ther, firms is close enough to the initial hypothesis to be an equilibrium.
wior The other five capacity-conversion scenarios all generate behavior that
•. We is not consistent with the assumed scenario. The high capacity scenario
leads to less than 3,000 million pounds of capacity, alt of it converted.
• Neither the total nor the conversion rate matches the assumption of low
capacity result. The medium capacity, low conversion scenario generates
(through firms' decisions) 4,284 million pounds of capacity, which is
consistent with the medium capacity hypothesis. However, the conver-
D the sion rate is 66 percent, pointing back to the medium capacity, high
acity conversion scenario as the most likely equilibrium.
id tO In view of the expectations that were widely held in 1972 and that
con- proved to be confirmed in the first two years thereafter, the equilibrium
analysis suggests that fairly rapid expansion of capacity was predictable
and consistent with informed strategic choices by rival firms in the indus-
•what try. This is not to say that the choices that firms actually made (which
One proved to be close to those reported in table 8.8) were based upon
ret- precisely this kind of analysis. We do not know enough about the decision
used making process to be able to make that assertion.
nake However, we can examine the decisions firms actually took in the
irm S initial phases of the market's growth to the extent that we have data on
tion: them. Table 8.8a shows the capacity expansion in the industry through
size, 1976.
f the The medium capacity scenario has higher capacity levels than those
•ance actually observed in 1973—76. However, this is partly a matter of timing.
By 1976 the industry had under construction over 4 billion pounds of
the capacity, which came on-stream in the period following 1976. The
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Actual industry capacity (estimated)* 0.6 1 1,4 2.2
Medium capacity scenario .6 1.5 3.5 3.5
*Based on sales, assuming full capacity utilization during 1973—75.
predicts the building of capacity somewhat earlier than it actually oc-
curred.
We cannot be sure of the individual company capacity decisions.
Archer-Daniels-Midland had close to 1 billion pounds of capacity by
1976.' The other predictions in table 8.8 generally correspond to what we
know about the behavior of other competitors.'°
This history of the events in the market is interesting. In 1973 the
industry capacity expansion began accelerating. There was great enthu-
siasm on the part of industry participants and analysts. Demand growth
was aided by a tremendous surge in sugar prices in 1974. Amstar, a
leading sugar producer, entered HFCS to protect itself in the sweetener
market. However, at the end of 1974 the sugar legislation in
the United States lapsed and was not renewed because of high sugar
prices. The latter then tumbled to the eight cent per pound level. This
adversely affected the HFCS market. By 1976 the capacity planned in
1973—74 was coming on-stream, while demand was falling off. By late
1976 industry capacity utilization was low (in the neighborhood of 60
percent) and the profits had been squeezed out of the margins in the
industry. By 1977 analysts were predicting a return to full capacity only by
the end of the decade.
8.10The Effect of Expectations, Risk, and Uncertainty
on the Evolution of the Market
The behavior of the firms, the nature of the equilibrium, and the
character of the evolutionary process depend upon the underlying ex-
pectations about demand. This section is devoted to the relation between
uncertainty and the equilibrium expansion path for the industry.
Uncertainty acts as a stabilizing and leveling force in the capacity
expansion process. In the HFCS problem there was considerable uncer-
tainty about demand. As a firm increased its level of investment in HFCS
capacity, it increased its mean return, but it also increased its risk and
exposure to very poor outcomes, as is readily apparent in the tables in
appendix A. This exposure causes even the less risk-averse firms to
choose to limit their investment, even when the expected return is high.
Under different circumstances involving lower risk, a strategy of aggres-
sively preempting more of the market might have been desirable. But
S282 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
with significant downside risks, taking a dominant market share was not a
prudent strategy.
We can illustrate the role of uncertainty in firm behavior by examining
the effects of changes in the expected probability distribution of demand
on the risk-return trade-off of alternative strategies under various
assumed capacity scenarios. Figures 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 plot the undomi.
nated strategies in risk-return space for firm 1 (American Maize) for
several probability distributions and the low, medium, and high capacity
addition scenarios (all with high conversion). The horizontal axis is the
expected present value, and the vertical axis is the standard deviation.
The strategy option corresponding to each point on the graph is the
circled number, and the bracketed numbers are the probabilities
assumed.
In the low and medium capacity scenarios, more aggressive strategies
generally increase return but always increase risk. In the high capacity
scenario, more aggressive strategies often lead to lower expected returns
and higher risk. Increasing uncertainty raises the risk for each strategic
option and rotates the risk return frontier leftward. This makes more
conservative strategies more likely, holding firms' risk-return trade.offs
constant. Where firms have varying risk postures, uncertainty thus makes
firms' optional choices increasingly dependent on their tolerance for risk.
In the analysis in table 8.8, where the equilibrium is portrayed, the
largest projected share of capacity for a single firm is 21.4 percent. It
belongs to Archer-Daniels-Midland. The original two firms that were
participants in HFCS, Standard Brands and Staley, end up with 18.2
percent of capacity each, while the fourth largest firm is Cargill with 14
percent of the market. The resulting four-firm concentration ratio is 70
percent. This is high, but is not the industry dominance one would expect
if one or two firms aggressively preempted the market. Uncertainty,
•then, represents a significant qualification to the strategy of preemptive
capacity expansion and growth.
To see just how central the role of uncertainty is, it is useful to consider
how the strategic opportunities would appear when risks are significantly
lower. It is not difficult to see that with little or no exogenous risk, the
ultimate size of the market is known almost with certainty. Under these
circumstances, the strategies can be ordered unambiguously. Depending
on the known demand, the firm will either do nothing or build to the limit.
This can be readily seen in figures 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, where removing
uncertainty makes the risk-return lines horizontal.
With no uncertainty, preemptive investment, limited only by the finan-
cial resources available to the firm, becomes the appropriate strategy
because it clearly maximizes discounted cash flow. The issue in the
capacity expansion process becomes one of who can move first and fastest








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)286 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
much known demand to serve. Under these circumstances, however, the as derri
firm faces the problem of other firms with the same idea. firms
In formal terms, the reduction of uncertainty transforms the game from
one with a single equilibrium to one with many equilibria. Without avers
uncertainty, the optimal strategy for each firm is to expand capacity so as risk a
to supply whatever demand is not covered by rivals' known capacity.
Thus, there are multiple equilibria depending on whether one firm gets a one.
jump and supplies the whole market or various combinations of firms do. enou1
The problem for the individual firm is to ensure that the equilibrium that the ri
is achieved is as favorable to it as possible. That entails expanding as fast small
as possible itself, but ensuring that others do not. This requires trying to Th
preempt by means of public announcements of major capacity and con- beyot
tracting very early for the construction of facilities. If preemption is learni
attempted by many firms and fails, then massive overcapacity will result. heve
Thus, with no uncertainty about demand, a new form of risk may emerge
to replace it. With significant uncertainty about demand, this form of risk effec
is not important because preemption is not a rational strategy except strat
under extreme risk-taking behavior. From inspection of figures 8.2, 8.3, vidu
and 8.4, it is clear that as uncertainty about demand is reduced, a firm's
risk-return frontiers or options become flatter and flatter, and strategies igh
of preemption (and therefore multiple equilibria) increasingly likely.
SeII'
Unless firms lack an aversion to risk and can bear significant drains on ei
cash, uncertainty will cause them to prefer and to choose lower levels of ron
investment in the market.' At least over a range, increases in uncertainty miti
are likely to reduce the range of equilibrium market shares because atte
individual firms will not choose to attempt a preemptive investment 8.11
strategy. One important implication of this line of reasoning is that an
industry that evolves in an uncertain environment is likely to end up less
concentrated than one whose evolutionary growth phase is characterized cau
by greater certainty about future demand. Certainty in the evolutionary
exa
phase will lead to competitive warfare, the exit of firms, and the potential
th for high concentration.
e
These observations require some qualification. As a first approxima-
tion, an increase in uncertainty causes the desired levels of capacity to
th5 fall. That may or may not reduce concentration depending upon whether
the less risk-averse firms contract relatively more than do the more
me
risk-averse firms. There are two forces at work. As the uncertainty about
demand increases, firms reduce planned investment. As a result, firms
just on the margin of entering may find entry attractive where they did not
a
before, because of the contraction of the larger firms. On the other hand,
when investments of firms that were in the market are held constant, an
D increase in risk reduces the attractiveness of the market. It seems reason-
able to hypothesize (and Spence 1979b has been able to show) that under Pr
* certain conditions, concentration is a U-shaped function of risk. That is, —287 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
as demand uncertainty increases, beginning at a low level, the number of
the firms that find it attractive to enter at some scale rises. But as the risk
increases further, the market becomes unattractive to the more risk-
rom averse firms in spite of the reduced levels of investment of the larger, less
hout risk averse rivals.
,O as In these terms, the HFCS case would be regarded as an intermediate
city, one. The risks were high enough to prevent any firm from making a large
Sa enough investment to achieve a dominant share (40 percent or more of
the market). But the risks and costs were not so large as to prevent
fat smaller firms from entering the HFCS market at relatively small scales.
The model assumes constant returns to scale in HFCS production go beyond a one-MES add-on strategy, and no reduction in costs owing to a
is learning curve, for early entrants. This is because most observers be-
suIt lieved these assumptions were largely accurate in the corn wet milling
industry. However, such cost behavior could be added to the model. The
• effect would be to flatten the risk-return trade-offs of alternative
ce strategies and increase the attractiveness of larger investments by mdi-
8 vidual firms, particularly those that were more prepared to take risks.
TheHFCS market was in some sense an intermediate case. Risk was
gies high, but not so high as to force everyone into adopting the most con-
servative strategies. Also, in HFCS as in other markets firms differed in
their attitudes toward, and tolerance for, risk. Thus, their choices ranged
Is of from no investment, to a small-scale conservative entry, to modest corn-
inty mitment to a leadership position. No one could justify a preemptive
tuse attempt to capture a dominant share.
tent 8.10.1Different Expectations and Equilibrium
tan
less Apart from uncertainty and risk, different expectations could have
ized caused a dramatically different evolution in the HFCS market. For
Itary example, with less optimistic expectations, the low capacity scenario with
-itial a substantial amount of conversiOn would have been the outcome. With
the probabilities shown in table 8.9, the model yields a low capacity
ma- expansion outcome with 50 percent conversion, as shown in table 8.10.
to As was the case earlier, the strategies adopted by firms are based upon
:her the calculated present values and cash flows for each firm, and an assess-
(ore ment of their attitudes toward risk and their financial resources.
out Similarly, with very optimistic probabilities, a high capacity equilib-
rms rium could have developed in the market. However, with probabilities






Table 8.9 Probabilities Yielding a Low Capacity Equilibrium
Demand Low Low Medium Medium High High
Sugar price Low Medium Medium High Medium High






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I289 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
face of a large total industry capacity, the variance of returns tends to fall.
As the earlier discussion of risk indicated, this will push firms toward
preeçnption, and the market toward multiple equilibria. Applying the
technique used in the previous section will not guarantee an equilibrium.
There is too much "doing the same thing": either very large expansions
or doing nothing. This, of course, is exactly what one would expect. With
demand uncertainty hypothetically reduced, the principal differentiating
feature of firms, their attitudes to and tolerance for risk, becomes less and
less relevant.
8.11Expectations and Risk Aversion
in the Capacity Expansion Process
Our model has treated firms' expectations about future demand and
competitor behavior as exogenous and independent. We have treated the
risk aversion of firms as independently and exogenously determined as
well, and our judgments about each firm's trade-off of risk and return
were based on assessments of the backgrounds of each firm's manage-
• ment, the place of the corn wet milling operation in each firm's overall
operations, and other factors described earlier. Yet neither firms' ex-
pectations about the future nor their risk aversion indepen-
dent and exogenous in the capacity expansion process. There are strong
reasons to suspect that both are generated endogenously through a
variety of processes that will be crucial to further understanding the
capacity expansion decisions that actually take place.
8.11.1Expectations about Future Demand
Firms form their expectations about future demand in part through
independent analysis and discussions with customers. However, all firms
in the industry obtain information about future prospects directly or
indirectly from many common sources. There are mechanisms which
cause expectations to converge and perhaps also to inflate.
One common information source used by firms is the limited number of
prospective customers, most of whom firms already serve with other
products. Through these common buyers all firms will have access to
essentially similar views of customer needs.
A second common source. of information comes from the interaction
between firms and the capital markets, where the security analysts play a
major role in information flow and expectations creation. Security
analysts are in business to recommend purchases of stock based on
company research. They develop predictions of future demand that are
published and widely read by industry participants. Analysts rely heavily
on interviews with industry participants in information gathering, and
hence provide another mechanism for the circulation of predictions about
the future among firms and thus for the convergence of expectations.They also interview customers and other industry observers, from whom
many of the firms also gather information.
Embedded in this argument is a view that capital markets are imperfect
in an informational sense. Lacking full information about the future, the
capital markets react to signals about future conditions of firms. These
signals take the form of statements by management and historical firm
results, filtered through security analysts. Major investment decisions are
also signals, taken in the context of a general overview about the pro..
priety of making them, as portrayed by analysts and the financial press.
There is therefore a significant role for security analysts and the capital
markets in the capacity expansion process.
Through analysts, firms can play a role in creating an optimistic bias in
judgments about future demand. Firms seek to maximize the price of
their shares. They do this by portraying the future as optimistically as
they can to analysts. While overoptimistic predictions by firms about the
future carry the risk of failure to deliver, it can be argued that investors
have short memories and that rationalizations for results below forecast
are usually available. Thus, the increase in stock prices generated by
optimistic predictions the future are greater the negative
movements in stock price caused by unrealized predictions. If firms
attempt to portray themselves optimistically, then this information is
circulated through the security analysts to other firms, tending to inflate
other firms' predictions through a risk aversion process that will be
described below.
Firms also communicate with one another through their public state-
ments in the press, through their annual reports and other public docu-
ments, and through appearances by management before groups of secur-
ity analysts. This communication provides a mechanism for expectations
to converge.
Finally, firms communicate expectations to one another through actual
decisions to commit resources. If one firm announces a capacity decision,
this communicates that firm's implicit expectations about demand to the
other firms in a particularly credible fashion. Thus, there is a wide variety
of mechanisms to aid in convergence of expectations about future de-
mand.
A firm might try to use these mechanisms to create mistaken expecta-
tions about the future. A firm would gain, for example, if every other firm
thought future demand would be low when it really would be high. The
bluffer could build capacity sooner, and reap the benefits while its rivals
caught up. However, communicating such mistakenly negative expecta-
tions worsens the firm's position with the capital markets and thus carries
a cost to the firm. Perhaps as a result, one rarely observes firms making
bearish statements about future demand. At worst, demand is expected


































L.to be "temporarily" depressed or "temporarily" modest, while the future
holds great promise.
In most markets, including the corn wet milling industry, it makes little
sense for the firm to create mistakenly high expectations about demand in
its rivals. This is because doing so will create excess capacity, hurting the
firm as well as its rivals, though its rivals will be hurt more if they build
mistakenly. Such an incentive not to overinflate rivals' expectations goes
directly against the pressure to paint an optimistic picture of the future to
the capital markets.
A final factor to be noted about future expectations is that many
managers seem to prefer progress and making positive moves to pessi-
mism and inaction. It is also human nature to be optimistic about the
future if possible. This may create an additional optimistic bias in future
expectations.
8.11.2Risk Aversion
A firm's risk-return trade-off function is due in part to a wide range of
factors specific to its particular situation. However, there is a sense in
which the risk aversion of firms in a market is endogenous.
Consider a situation where there are long lead times in building capacity.
Suppose a manager has the choice of building capacity or not building it,
with future demand being either high or low. As table 8.11 shows, if the
manager chooses not to build, his best outcome is satisfactory profits in
the event that demand proves to be low. But suppose he chooses not to
build, demand proves to be high, and all of his competitors build capac-
ity. Here the manager is in difficulty; his incorrect decision is hard to
explain. On the other hand, if he builds capacity along with all his
competitors, if demand proves to be low, then blame can be shared or
attributed to industrywide factors out of his control. Thus, the risk averse
manager may well build capacity even if doing so would not be justified by
the firm's true expectations about the future and risk-return indifference
curve, provided other firms in the industry are building capacity. If no
other firm builds capacity, it will be a rare manager who builds unless his
beliefs about the future are extremely strong (or he ignores uncertainty).
This analysis would suggest that once a few firms have announced





Table 8.11 Outcomes ofBuilding Decisions .
Future Demand
High Low
Build High profits Low profits
Don't build Lost profits Medium profits
4.
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communicatedoptimistic expectations about future demand through the
mechanisms described earlier, many firms will rapidly announce capacity and tl{
additions. This bandwagon effect would tend to produce excess capacity diver1
in the industry and work against any but a high capacity equilibrium in of th
our sense. futun
The bandwagon effect is reinforced by the capital markets if security
analysts hold positive expectations about the future. Pressure from with
analysts and stockholders on management to build capacity will grow equili
within firms which have not announced capacity additions. In fact, iOUS I
announcementsof capacity additions may become key signals to the stock there
market which result in share price increases. Thus, in the face of generally verge
optimistic expectations about future demand, even though there may be and si
great uncertainty there will be a strong tendency toward overbuilding of as a
capacity through shifts in the shape of firms' indifference curves. priot
If this bandwagon process is present, then a preemptive strategy by one dete
or more firms can be disastrous. A preemptive strategy, accompanied by they
aggressive language about future expectations and planned behavior, can and
virtually guarantee upward-spiraling capacity additions, of p
pect
8.12Conclusions corn
It may be useful to conclude this analysis by underscoring the major deci
points and by identifying areas in which further research would yield a T
high payoff. evo,
The main point is that it is possible to calculate the most likely capacity ana
decisions for firms in an expanding market. Those calculations are based don
upon the assumption that firms will come to a common view about each circ
other's decisions. They will do this by analyzing their competitors' deci- this
sions, conditional upon hypotheses about the rate of capacity expansion sha
in the industry, thereby finding the capacity expansion hypothesis that is tair
consistent with the decisions that are expected, conditional on that ma
hypothesis. Capacity expansion scenarios that are consistent with mdi- est
vidual firm decisions are referred to as "equilibria." I
As a prediction about what will happen in a market, such equilibria set
seem to us a natural focus of attention. Using the beliefs about the market
potential that prevailed in the industry, the resulting medium capacity, Ot
high conversion equilibrium is a reasonable approximation to actual th(
behavior in the corn wet milling industry. But several qualifications are in pad
order. First, firms may make mistakes about their competitors' prefer-
ences, capabilities, and financial resources. This introduces some slip- tuli
page, in the form of increased uncertainty, into the process. Second,
firms may fail to analyze rivals carefully; they may make assumptions
about industry capacity that would not be borne out by a careful analysis en
of competitor decisions based on a shared industry capacity assumption. wi• 293 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
h the Third, firms may have different views about demand: its expected level
acit and the uncertainty surrounding it. This may cause their behavior to
diverge from that predicted by a rival which approaches the demand side
of the capacity decision problem with different judgments about the
future.
urity The second point that emerges is that the equilibrium outcome varies
from with expectations concerning demand and market potential. The entire
grow equilibrium analysis rests upon assumptions about the likelihood of var-
fact ious rates of growth of the market. We have argued in section 8.11 that
I there are factors at work that cause expectations about demand to con-
rally verge among competitors and other interested parties such as customers
ty be and security analysts. Nevertheless, the model takes these expectations
ig of as a datum.2 There is little doubt in our minds that a high research
priority should be accorded to the problem of how these expectations are
one determined. While the expectations represent subjective judgments,
•d by they are influenced by signals from the environment, by past experience,
can and by the expectations of others, It is not, therefore, beyond the realm
of possibility that the processes that influence the formation of expecta-
tions can be subjected to analysis similar to that presented above. Ex-
• pectations formation would be a function of the actual decisions by
competitors embodied in our model, the information content in those
ajor decisions, and other signaling behavior of competitors.
id a The third major area of interest is the effect of uncertainty on the
evolution of the industry and on its ultimate structure. Business strategy
city analysis has emphasized the importance of large shares and of achieving
sed dominant positions by making preemptive investments under the right
ach circumstances. The question of the desirability of dominant shares aside,
eci- this leaves unanswered how a firm should go about achieving a dominant
ion share. The analysis above suggests that the presence of exogenous uncer-
tt is tainty makes preemptive investments unattractive. Nevertheless, there
-hat may be profitable investment opportunities, contemplated at more mod-
)di- est scales, in markets with high uncertainty.
From an economic standpoint, the effect of uncertainty is to shrink the
ria set of equilibria, eliminating the points characterized by large shares for a
ket few firms. In the absence of uncertainty, the set of equilibria is large.'3
ity, Other considerations, such as who is able to move first or credibly commit
ual themselves to these moves, then determine the outcome from the ex-
in panded equilibrium set. One of the effects of uncertainty in the growth
phase is thus to reduce the concentration of the mature industry. That in
ip- turn can affect the profitability and performance of the industry in other
dimensions after the period of rapid growth is over.
The observation that uncertainty reduces the incentive to make pre-
emptive investments raises another research topic. In those markets
where uncertainty either is not especially large or is rapidly resolved, the•1
294 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
equilibrium analysis does not tell us what will happen. Further analysis of
the preemption process is required to determine who will move first, how
commitments are made credible, and what signals effectively communj.
cate intentions. Attention to constraints on growth, to the Possible
advantages of diversified firms with internal financial resources, and to
other influential factors will be required.
The high fructose corn syrup problem is not atypical of the expansion
problem in general. As with any market, there are some unique features,
but the problem is similar to that encountered in many other industries.
With a commodity product, the strategic decisions focus upon capacity,
scale, and costs. Compared with consumer products or capital goods, the
problem is less complicated in that the product policy, marketing, and
related decisions are less intricate. Applying this framework to the more
complex situations will require careful attention to cross-elasticities of
demand and market segmentation. But there seems no reason to expect







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N306 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence
Appendix B.Summary of Considerations
in Predicting Individual.
Firm Decisions
American Maize. This company is committed to the corn milling industry rn
because of long participation and the background of top management. It H
cannot withstand very large negative cumulative cash flows, but it will
want to participate in the HFCS market. American Maize is one of the
older CWM companies that had been damaged by the entry into CWM of
Cargill and Archer-Daniels-Midland, both of which entered with large,
efficient operations. m
Anheuser-Busch. Primarily a beer company, AB developed its own en-
zyme technology for HFCS production. It will enter if the opportunity is
.right. The financial resources are large enough to absorb risk, but AB is
far from committed to CWM. The AB corn milling operation reports to a
Busch executive also responsible for the St. Louis Cardinals and Busch
Gardens, other AB operations. Busch has been in corn milling primarily e
as a by-product of technological capability drawn from opera-
tions.
Archer-Daniels-Midland. A closely held company with large financial
resources, ADM had successfully entered CWM in 1970—71. The corn-
pany's experience is in agricultural commodities, and it is used to low
margins and wide earnings swings, and to surviving through competing
with large, highly efficient facilities. ADM can absorb risk and is known
as a risk taking company. Short-run dips in stock prices are of less concern
to ADM than to less closely held firms. ADM was likely to invest heavily,
as it had in basic CWM in 1970—71.
Cargill. Cargill is an extremely large, privately held, very successful grain
trading company that was diversifying into other commodity products
much like ADM. Cargill has much in common with ADM: it is a risk
taker, it has significant financial resources, it is experienced with cyclical
commodities, and it is used to competing on cost and scale. Our feeling is
that Cargill is slightly more conservative in taking risks than ADM.
CPC international. Long the historical leader in CWM, CPC had relin-
quished a substantial share of the market by 1972. Managerial and
financial resources had been devoted to a successful program of interna-
tional expansion and diversification into consumer products. CPC had
the financial resources to compete vigorously in HFCS, was very conser-
vatively managed, and was attempting to achieve steady growth in sales
and earnings. In 1972, HFCS was likely to appear too risky to justify a
major commitment of resources. CPC therefore would enter tentatively
and in a small way.
- ,
S307 The Case of Corn Wet Milling
Grain Processing. This is a privately held company with a history similar
to that of ADM and Cargill. We know very little about GP, and hence
their behavior is hard to predict. They entered CWM in the mid-sixties
before Cargill and ADM. That entry seemed less aggressive than the later
ry
moves by Cargill and ADM.
It Hubinger. 1-lubinger is a small old-line corn wet miller. Itis totally
ifl dependent on CWM and in financial difficulty as a result of the price wars
ie accompanying ADM's entry into CWM in 1970—71. Hubinger will want
of to participate in HFCS, but with limited financial resources could not
e, mount a major effort. At most they would be likely to convert. As a
matter of history the H. J. Heinz Company bought Hubinger in 1975
(having failed in a bid to acquire Staley), and with Heinz's considerable
is resources, Hubinger did move into HFCS in 1976.
is National Starch. This company is a relatively small, enormously success-
•a ful specialty starch and adhesives company whose strategy consists of
R&D and product differentiation. NS has consistently avoided undiffer-
ly entiated commodities and the need for high volume, low cost operations
a- by producing only specialty starches among CWM products. NS is well
• managed and would not regard HFCS as either a threat or an appropriate
al opportunity. It was the least vulnerable of any firm to excess capacity in
the traditional HFCS markets.
w Pennick & Ford. A relatively small old-line CWM company, P&F, like
Hubinger, was hurt by the ADM entry. P&F was purchased by R. J
Reynolds in the mid-1960s and then sold under Federal Trade Commis-
sion pressure to VWR Corporation. VWR was experiencing profitability
problems, and the P&F operation was losing money in 1972. P&F could
want to play the HFCS game, but lacked the financial resources for a
large, risky commitment and perhaps even for a modest commitment.
ts Staley. Staley was a major participant in CWM and the only firm to
•;k license the HFCS technology from Standard Brands before 1972. In 1972,
al Staley had 200 million pounds of HFCS capacity on-stream, about the
IS same as Standard Brands. Staley is heavily committed to HFCS and
possesses significant financial resources. But a very large investment in
HFCS may strain Staley's financial situation depending upon how the
HFCS market develops.
a- Standard Brands. SB is a diversified consumer food products company. It
id purchased Japanese technology for HFCS production and pioneered the
commercial introduction of HFCS in the United States. SB had signifi-
cantfinancial resources and is not heavily dependent on CWM. It like
a CPC had turned its attention away from corn wet milling into other
businesses in recent years and offered to license the technology to any
firm that wanted it. Its initial strategy seemed to be to encourage develop-308 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spence 30f
ment of the HFCS market while aggressively leading the development.
Thus, it will probably invest, but not attempt to preempt the market.
Asa matter of historical record, Amstar, the largest sugar refiner in the
United States, also entered HFCS, to hedge against the obvious threat
HFCS presented to the traditional sugar markets. It was believed, and
still is to some extent, that HFCS is, in the long run, at least as inexpen-





1. All data used in this paper are taken from Michael E. Porter and Margaret Lawrence,
Note on the Corn Wet Milling Industry in 1972 (Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse, Boston,
1978, Case 1—378—186, and Note on the Corn Wet Milling Industry, 1973—1977 (Intercollegi-
ate Case Clearinghouse, Boston, 1978, Case 1—378—206).
2. The industry also produced other products, including dextrose and dextrins. They are A1
not nearly so important as starch and corn syrup, and are omitted from the discussion for Oil
simplicity.
3. This Nash equilibrium concept has been criticized in static models on the grounds that V
it involves mistaken assumptions about rivals' behavior. The point there is that an oligopoly 0
gameis played repeatedly or continuously. This creates a situation in which learning about W
rivals'behavior can occur and behavior can adapt. However, the capacity expansion game is h
played once. The issue of whether to assume firms will continue doing what they are doing
now (a poor assumption in the pricing problem) does not arise here. In the capacity
expansion situation, the problem for the firm is to avoid errors about rivals' behavior. That,. 11
weargue, involves finding a pairing of individual firm choices and aggregate outcomes that is
internally consistent. ti
4. All demand figures are taken from United States Department of Agriculture Sugar S
and Sweetener Reports.
5. More precisely, this involves making the following approximation: Our interest will be
in the mean and variance of the present value of net cash flows. Since the cash flow in period
depends on sugar price in period t, the expected value or mean of the present value is not
affected by our implicit assumption that sugar prices are perfectly correlated over time. The
variance, however, is affected. Let Vr(pt) be the discounted present value of the derivation
of the cash flow in period t, as a function of the sugar price in period t.Thevariance of the




Takinga linear approximation Vt(pt) = — -
V=
What we did is set Pt =p,a random variable. Thus, our calculated variance is
T —I V= I .
1
Lettingsrt be 1he correlation coefficient for p1 and pr,
V =I
4• 309 TheCase of Corn Wet Milling
Thus,themeasure we used, overstates the variance of the present value of cash flows by
an amount that depends inversely on the closeness of the serial correlationand V. With no
serial correlation, all the terms in V withi are zero. With more time and a larger budget
one would want to estimate an autoregressive model for sugar prices and use that in
calculating V. But that was not done here. The result is an overstatement of the variance of
present value of net cash flows.
6. Making capacity expansion adapt to demand is in lieu of a full dynamic programming
treatment in which one would work backward from future to present decisions.
7. We have ignored for simplicity the option of adding corn syrup and HFCS refining
capacity to existing grind capacity.
8. We recall that the specific assumptions about HFCS demand are as follows: (a) In the
long run, liquid sugar and HFCS are close substitutes, and as a result HFCS will be priced
close to sugar. (b) Demand for HFCS is also a function of industry capacity. (c)Inthe short
and medium term, HFCS demand may be substantially below its long-run equilibrium level,
because of changeover costs and possible taste effects for bottlers.
9. Business Week, 15 November 1976.
10. For a listing of the announced capacity decisions, see "Note on the Corn Wet Milling
Industry, 1973—1977," Harvard Business School, Case 1—376—206.
11. One might interpret the preemptive investment prescription in a different way.
Admitting that uncertainty may make such a strategy unacceptably risky to a single firm,
one could use it as a screening device: put resources preemptively into markets where the
risks are not imprudently high. Or more bluntly, do not play risky competitive games.
Whether that is good advice depends upon the menu of investment opportunities that are
open to the firm. It has the luxury of choosing among low risk, high return investments; few
would argue that it should accept the risks involved in markets like l-IFCS, but not all firms
have this option.
12. The model takes expectations about demand as exogenous. Expectations about
capacity expansion and competitor behavior are endogenous, and emerge from the equilib-
rium analysis.
13. This problem of large numbers of equilibria is reminiscent of the oligopoly problem in
the mature industry, where reasonable concepts of equilibrium do not delimit the outcomes
sufficiently for predictive purposes.
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Comment Sidney 0. Winter
11
S
There are clearly good reasons to regard the Porter and Spence paper as
being in a different genre from the others presented at this conference—
for example, the others say very little about corn syrup. c
At a higher level of abstraction also, the paper has a unique orienta- a
tion. In my comments, I want to view the paper in perspective from a high
level of theoretical generality, and in so doing to emphasize some of its
distinctive features more than the authors themselves have done. The
"perspective" I offer is not •a critical one, for I find myself much in ti
sympathy with the sort of inquiry that Porter and Spence have under- e
taken. Their willingness to plunge into the detail of a specific industry in a a
specific historical setting and to organize that detail in a coherent theoret-
ical framework seems to me quite laudable. The resulting analysis illu-
•minates not merely the specific situation studied, but also the broad and -
fundamentalproblem of the role of prices and markets in coordinating
activity. On the other hand, I am skeptical about some details of their
approach. In the final section of my comment, I suggest an alternative -
viewof how oligopolists might succeed in coordinating their investment ii
behavior in the sort of situation they describe. t
In his 1968 presidential address to the Econometric Society, F. H.
Hahn reviewed some basic problems in analysis of the adjustment dy- -1
namics of market systems. He closed with an elegant and concise state-
ment of our central theoretical task: "The most intellectually exciting
question of our subject remains: is it true that the pursuit of private
interest produces not chaos but coherence, and if so, how is it done?"
(Hahn 1970, p. 12). To study economic dynamics is, of course, to appreci-
ate the particular importance of the query, How is it done? The result of
Hahn's survey was a rather gloomy appraisal of the progress that econo-
mic theorists had made in understanding the mechanism of the "invisible
hand": "I see no support for the view that any of the traditional methods
of response of various agents to their economic environment makes the
'hand' perform as it is often taken to perform." (Hahn 1970, p. 1).
Although there have been many important advances in economic
theory since Hahn's address, a similar survey today would no doubt reach
much the same conclusion. Progress toward understanding the active
coordinating function of the market mechanism has been minimal. This is
a consequence of the overwhelmingly dominant role of equilibrium
analysis in the research method of most economic theorists. As practiced
by economists, equilibrium analysis involves the application of consist-
ency tests to limit the range of situations that are regarded as actually
realizable in economic life. The great power of the method lies precisely
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in the fact that it obviates the need to study the complicated and probably
situation-specific dynamic processes by which "inconsistencies" in the
system are identified and eliminated. However, it is hardly surprising that
economists remain uninformed about the answers to questions they have
chosen to suppress. The question, How is it done? remains largely un-
answered because it remains largely unexplored.
That equilibrium analysis, as usually practiced, fails to illuminate dis-
equilibrium processes is inherent in the logic of the method. That the
failure is an important one—perhaps so important as ultimately to force
the sacrifice of the great simplifications the method yields—is a feature of
economic reality. More specifically, the importance of the failure can be
attributed to the following four features of reality, taken singly and in
combination.
—Futures markets and contingent markets exist only in negligible pro-
portion to the scope envisaged for these institutional devices in abstract
models of efficient intertemporal allocation under uncertainty.
—The institutional reality does not include a tatônnement; more broadly,
it includes no device for systematically checking the çonsistency of tenta-
• tive plans formulated by a large fraction of economic actors before actual
• implementation of those plans has begun.
• —The existence of specialized producers' durables and the cost condi-
• tions characteristic of processes of information acquisition, transfer, and
storage contribute an important degree of irreversibility to many eco-
nomic decisions; i.e., with all prices held constant there are large present
value sacrifices involved in reverting to an initial state after having taken
certain sorts of actions.
—Technological change continually generates new, imperfectly antici-
• pated allocational possibilities, and at the same time destroys the viability
of old allocations; more broadly, such processes of long-term historical
-
• changeas population growth, industrialization, resource depletion,
waste accumulation, and naturally occurring climatic change all combine
with advancing technology to present a continually novel context for all
economic choice.
But for the first two considerations, the market mechanism would in
fact be the sort of planning system to which economists often compare it.
Currently functioning markets would signal the future consequences of
proposed current action, conditioned by the proposed current actions of
others. But in fact, it is overwhelmingly the case that it is steps actually
• taken by each actor that impinge on the others, not steps contemplated.
And the implications of steps actually taken may remain latent and
obscured for a long time, before they affect prices in a functioning
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represent it as a system that checks plans for mutual consistency is to
employ a loose and misleading metaphor.
Were it not for the third consideration, the consequences of imperfect
coordination would be ephemeral, and the distinction between consist-
ency testing of plans and consistency testing of actual actions would
evaporate. As inconsistencies appeared, revealing some past choices as
mistaken, there would be quick reversals and redirections of action. The
stability properties of such a multiactor, frictionless quest for a consistent
solution are problematic, but at least the social learning process would
not be complicated and slowed by the accumulating, slowly depreciating
"debris of the actual groping process" (Hahn 1970, p. 4). As it is, the
actor who has made an economically irreversible mistake has presumably
learned something about the problem he faced, but he now faces a new
problem. And the actor who has somehow stumbled on the (or "an")
equilibrium action will fail to find corroboration of his choice as the
durable consequences of the mistaken choices of others shape his en-
vironment.
Finally, the reality of nonrepetitive historical change mocks the
equilibrium theorist's last-resort comforting thought, proposition
that, if the problem stands still, the social learning process will surely find
the right answer to it. Given enough time, even slow learners making
slowly depreciating mistakes should be able to grope their way to a
solution. Again, acceptance of this hypothetical proposition is qualified
by concerns about the stability of the adjustment process; also, informa-
tion cost considerations provide reason to doubt the supposition that the
accumulation of sufficient experience is the only requisite of perfect
learning. But the important point is that these sorts of questions arise
only in models. In reality, the problem is not standing still at all.
I should emphasize that the foregoing considerations do not directly
imply any judgment on the merits of market mechanisms and the pursuit
of private interest as against any concrete organizational alternative for
dealing with the social coordination problem. The invisible hand has
many strengths, and in many contexts those strengths may confer a
decisive superiority relative to other arrangements. Rather, the judg-
ment is about the adequacy of equilibrium analysis in the neo-Walrasian
tradition, and it is one of skepticism about the ability of that sort of
analysis to reveal the true character of the institutional arrangements it
purports to analyze. The insights of Hayek (1948) and Schumpeter
(1950),thoughadmittedly undeveloped by contemporary standards, may
have a more direct bearing on the "most intellectually exciting question
of our subject" than the modern theorist's storehouse full of existence
and optimality results.
Now consider, from this point of view, the situation in the corn wet
milling industry that Porter and Spence describe. A technological ad-
vance—the development of a commercially viable production method for
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high fructose corn syrup—faced the firms of the industry with a novel
decision context. The market for their products had expanded in a
relatively unanticipated and discontinuous manner, an aspect of the situa-
tion underemphasized by the title of the Porter and Spence paper. It was
clear that the new product represented a profit opportunity, but the size
of the market would ultimately depend on the degree to which HFCS
could displace sugar in various applications. Also, and fundamentally, it
was not at all clear to whom the profit opportunity "belonged." If all firms
were to respond aggressively by adding new capacity to produce FIFCS,
they might all regret it—even in the event of strong demand. On the other
hand, very timid responses all around would mean high profits per unit,
but low total profit. Thus, from the point of view of industry profitability,
and of course also from a social welfare point of view, a significant
coordination problem existed. By making investment decisions without a
proper allowance for the contemporaneous actions of others, firms could
easily sacrifice profits and waste resources. Overresponse in particular
posed the threat of prolonged overcapacity not just in HFCS, but in all
markets involving the same upstream processes. (The standard of a
"proper allowance" for the actions of others depends of course on
• whether one is concerned about profits sacrificed or resources wasted.)
An organized futures market in HFCS, extending several years into the
future, could have performed a valuable social role. The commodity itself
was sufficiently standardized to present no serious obstacles to such an
arrangement. Although producers might have been reluctant to enter
into unconditional contracts to deliver a commodity they had never
produced before, a more flexible standard contract could have been
devised to shift a part of the production risk to the buyer. An active
market in such futures contracts would have registered in price move-
ments the developing information on the relationship of capacity and
demand. Producers could have guided their capacity decisions accord-
ingly. Soft-drink manufacturers and other potential HFCS buyers would
have faced a clear measure of their incentive to convert from sugar to
HFCS, and could have laid off to speculators most of the risk associated
•. withtheir own investments in learning about the new sweetener. Of
course, a functioning futures market is not a tatônnement on intertempo-
f rat prices; there is more to coordination than aggregating available in-
formation about actions taken. But there was no futures market, let alone
a tatônnement. Perhaps there is a generalizable lesson here, a pessimistic
principle that says that economic change rarely goes forward in an institu-
tional context well suited for its guidance and control. Rather, the lag of
institutional adaptations behind the need for them is a part of the prob-
lem of change.
It seems unlikely that the investment response of the corn wet milling
industry to the HFCS opportunity came close to some plausible standard
of ex ante optimality, but of course such questions are almost as difficult314 Michael E. Porter/A. Michael Spencé 3
to judge in retrospect as in prospect. From the Porter and Spence
account, it does seem clear that the investment choices of the industry as a
whole didatleast display a good deal of coherence. Viewed in a Schum-
peterian perspective, their case study might even be appraised as a typical
success story for the market mechanism, only slightly qualified by refer-
ence to the generalized (and perhaps unavoidable) failure to appreciate
the depths to which the sugar price might sink. In the neo-Walrasian
framework, however, the story hardly fits at all. The market mechanisms
analyzed by Porter and Spence operate on different principles and per-
form different functions than the stylized market mechanisms of general
equilibrium theory.
Starkly put, their explanation of how "coherence" was achieved and
"chaos" avoided is that all firms computed the Cournot solution to the
HFCS investment problem and acted accordingly. The Cournot model
involved has a number of sophisticated elements, including demand
• uncertainty, mutual recognition of differentiating features of the oligopo-
listic rivals, and a range of qualitatively different investment options. But
the basic coordinating force is the assumed general principle that the
course of industry development anticipated by each individual firm is one
• it expects would be realized if it were generally anticipated. As the
authors rightly remark, the acceptability of the Cournot equilibrium
analysis in the context of the single-move investment game is consider-
• ably higher than it is in the more familiar context of output determina-
tion. It is important to emphasize, also, that they resort to equilibrium
analysis not merely as a convenient theoretical device, but as a plausible
abstraction of actual decision process in the industry—an answer to the
question, How is it done?"
The most fundamental contrast between their analysis and neo-
Wairasian equilibrium theory involves the informational role of prices.
Prices are not sustaining equilibrium; they are signaling disequilibrium.
The steps taken in response to disequilibrium are coordinated, imper-
• fectly, by a variety of nonprice information flows and by actors' anticipat-
ing each other's behavior. The results of those steps are only tardily
• reflected in price movements, when it is too late to. reconsider the steps
but not to adapt to the new disequilibrium that they have produced. The
players in the game need to know as much as possible about the details of
each other's situation. In the Porter and Spence account all firms are
performing the functions of the commissar for corn wet milling—a per-
spective sharply different not only from neo-Walrasian theory, but also
from the Hayekian picture of the information processing economies of
the market.
A number of features of the specific situation in the corn wet milling
industry contribute to the plausibility of the explanation offered for the
degree of coordination achieved.r
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—The situation involves a relatively short list of actors, all of whom are
known to each other. A flood of de novo entry into the industry, from
unidentified sources, is apparently not a sufficiently likely prospect to be
taken into consideration. The firms involved evidently think, with
reason, that they collectively "own" the new profit opportunity, although
it is not immediately obvious what the ownership shares are.
—The actors can draw on a large fund of shared information about each
other. The scale of past participation and previously revealed attitudes
toward risks are particularly important indicators of likely future be-
havior. Prediction efforts based on this sort of information are not
severely complicated by product differentiation or by secret development
efforts proceeding simultaneously in several laboratories.
—Similarly, the actors share a fund of information about the demand side
of the picture, derived from contacts with potential buyers and public
sources. Again, the absence of product differentiation simplifies the
problem of drawing inferences from this sort of information.
—Security analysts act as independent arbiters of expectations regarding
the future prospects of the industry as a whole. Provided that the expecta-
tion thus certified is reasonably accurate and consistent with the reactions
to it, this can make for improved coordination; otheñvise, it can mean the
investing firms are all wrong together.
—Firms communicate with each other through public statements, finan-
cial reports, and observable actions taken.
—Risk aversion and perhaps financial constraints limit recourse to
preemptive strategies. These considerations operate to restrain and sta-
bilize the aggregate industry investment to a degree that depends on the
size of the contemplated investment opportunity relative to the size of the
investing firms.
Any attempt to assess the generality of the mechanisms described, or
to apply similar logic to other cases, might well focus on the extent to
which these features of the original case are replicated.
I close these comments with a sketch of an alternative model of
investment coordination in the situation studied by Porter and Spence, a
model that seems to me to have somewhat greater behavioral plausibility
than the Cournot-style computation they impute to the firms. In this
alternative view, firms focus initially not on the capacity expansion path
of the industry but on the full cost of production (including target return)
of HFCS. This calculation would determine a price level just low enough
to eliminate incentives for further additions to capacity. Consideration of
the uncertain demand for HFCS would follow, resulting in a best estimate
of the capacity likely to be ultimately installed, perhaps with a qualifying
indication of high and low values. The first-cut answer to the question
how the opportunity would be shared in the industry would be provided
—4
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byreference to prevailing market shares in corn syrup. This
estimate would then be modified by each individual firm according to its
view of the special attributes and circumstances—including financial
comtraints, atypical cost conditions, and attitudes toward risk-_of its
rivals and itself. Such modifications would be constrained by the technical
indivisibility of investment and would not be likely to go outside therange
of plus or minus one MES plant. In finally carrying out its own plan, each
firm would view itself as laying claim to its appropriate, historically based
share of the new industry opportunity.
Like the Porter and Spence scheme, this alternative one has the central
property that it would not, in many circumstances, produce "chaos" in
the sense of a vast disproportion between the aggregate investment
undertaken and the estimated size of the aggregate opportunity. Also like
their scheme, there is a list of considerations that are highly relevant to its
efficacy as a coordination device, but there is only a partial overlap
between the two lists. In particular, the role played in their model by risk
aversion is here played by the assumption that firms roughly scale their
ambitions in the new market to their historical shares in the old one. This
change amounts to a more explicit recognition of the fact that what the
firms need to roughly coordinate their behavior is a Schelling (1960) focal
point. Although the carrying out of the same Cournot equilibrium cal-
culation by all parties might well provide the focal point if economic
theorists were doing the calculating, I suspect that the historical shares
approach would more readily come to the mind of the businessman.
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